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THE CONGRESSIONAL WAR ON CONTRACTORS
JESSICA TILLIPMAN*
What about mandatory suspension for criminal activity[?] . . .
[S]hould we not, just as a matter of character of our Nation, say if you
are indicted—like Halliburton was for bribery in Africa—for criminal
activity in connection with your government contracting activities, that
you are done with us?1
This comment by Senator Claire McCaskill, which is typical of
the congressional attitude towards government contractors, dem-
onstrates a fundamental misunderstanding of the suspension and
debarment2 regime, located in Part 9.4 of the Federal Acquisition
Regulations (FAR).  While inflammatory anti-contractor rhetoric is
not a new congressional phenomenon, it is no longer limited to
stump speeches, press releases, or politicized hearings.  Recent
congressional initiatives demonstrate many legislators’ desire to
transform debarment into a tool of punishment by banishing con-
tractors from the procurement system without regard to contractor
due process rights and “with little consideration of whether such
action is needed or fair.”3
* Assistant Dean for Field Placement and Professorial Lecturer in Law at The
George Washington University Law School.  Member of the District of Columbia, Virginia,
and U.S. Court of Federal Claims bars.  J.D. 2003, with honors, The George Washington
University Law School; B.S. 2000, cum laude, Miami University (Oxford, OH).  Ms. Til-
lipman teaches an Anti-Corruption seminar that focuses on corruption control issues in
government procurement.  She is also a Senior Editor of the FCPA Blog and a member of
the ABA Committee on Debarment & Suspension.  She would like to thank Chris Davis for
his excellent research and assistance.
1. Weeding Out Bad Contractors: Does the Government Have the Right Tools? Hearing Before
the Comm. on Homeland Sec. and Governmental Affairs, 112th Cong. 14 (2011) [hereinafter
Weeding Out Bad Contractors] (statement of Sen. Claire McCaskill).
2. For purposes of brevity, the use of the term “debarment” will hereinafter signify
both “debarment” and “suspension,” unless otherwise indicated.  Suspension is a tempo-
rary exclusion, typically imposed pending the completion of the government investigation
or legal proceedings related to the conduct for which the contractor was suspended. Id.
In contrast, debarment lasts for a period commensurate with the seriousness of the miscon-
duct, though typically not exceeding three years. See Jessica Tillipman, Suspension and
Debarment Part III: Mechanics and Mitigating Factors, FCPA BLOG (June 25, 2012), http://
www.fcpablog.com/blog/2012/6/25/suspension-debarment-part-iii-mechanics-and-miti-
gating-facto.html.
3. Steven Shaw, Don’t Go Overboard Banning Military Contractors, REUTERS (Aug. 8,
2012), http://blogs.reuters.com/great-debate/2012/08/08/dont-go-overboard-banning-
military-contractors.
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As FAR 9.4 clearly states, “The serious nature of debarment and
suspension requires that these sanctions be imposed only in the
public interest for the Government’s protection and not for purposes
of punishment.”4  Contrary to statements often made by certain
members of Congress, the FAR prohibits Suspension & Debarment
Officials (SDOs) from using debarment for the purpose of punish-
ing past misconduct.  Yet, despite the plain language of the FAR,
the punishment/protection distinction is often misunderstood or
simply ignored.5  Some critics of the U.S. system, and quite a few
members of Congress, see debarment primarily as a punitive mea-
sure without regard to a contractor’s present responsibility.6
Indeed, immediately following BP’s recent suspension from the
procurement system, Representative Ed Markey issued a press
release that stated: “BP Suspension of Government Contracts
Proper Punishment.”7  This stunning mischaracterization of the FAR
9.4 debarment regime not only contradicts the plain language of
the regulation, but contributes to the propagation of misinforma-
tion to a public that is largely under-informed about this process.
I. FAR 9.4: PRESENT RESPONSIBILITY—NOT PUNISHMENT
The FAR 9.4 regime is designed to ensure that the federal gov-
ernment does business only with “responsible” partners.8  Debar-
ment reinforces this policy by precluding the award of new
contracts to companies whose misconduct indicates they are no
longer responsible enough to do business with the U.S. govern-
4. See Federal Acquisition Regulations, 48 C.F.R. § 9.402(b) (2012) (emphasis
added) (“Agencies shall impose debarment or suspension to protect the Government’s
interest and only for the causes and in accordance with the procedures set forth in this
subpart.”).
5. Jessica Tillipman, A House of Cards Falls: Why “Too Big to Debar” Is All Slogan and
Little Substance, 80 FORDHAM L. REV. RES GESTAE 49, 50–51 (2012) (describing the distinc-
tion between punishment and protection).
6. See, e.g., Edolphus Towns, To Protect Taxpayer Dollars, Agencies Must Suspend and
Debar Bad Government Contractors, HUFFINGTON POST (Mar. 19, 2010), http://www.huf-
fingtonpost.com/chairman-ed-towns/to-protect-taxpayer-dolla_b_505705.html (“With bil-
lions of tax dollars on the line, it is far past time for agencies to suspend and debar bad
actors and for agency managers to aggressively enforce this process.  Failure to enforce the
law against bad actors is unfair to responsible companies and unfair to taxpayers.”).
7. Press Release, Ed Markey, Markey: BP Suspension of Government Contracts
Proper Punishment (Nov. 28, 2012), available at http://markey.house.gov/press-release/
markey-bp-suspension-government-contracts-proper-punishment (emphasis added).
8. See 48 C.F.R. § 9.103 (“Purchases shall be made from, and contracts shall be
awarded to, responsible prospective contractors only.”); see also 48 C.F.R. § 9.104-1 (provid-
ing a list of the factors that define a presently responsible contractor).
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ment.9  Debarment is government-wide and precludes contractors
from obtaining any new government contracts or subcontracts.10  It
is a discretionary, administrative remedy that enables agencies to
exclude contractors from the federal procurement system only to
protect the government from the imminent harm that may result
from doing business with a non-responsible contractor.11  “Debar-
ment may last for up to three years, and may be as broad or as
limited as the government deems necessary to protect its interests,
ranging from the debarment of the entire company to the debar-
ment of a division, facility, or even a single individual.”12  While it is
always reasonable to expect ethical conduct from companies that
receive taxpayer dollars, the debarment regime must be used
appropriately—to protect the government, and not to punish con-
tractors that do not pose a threat to government interests.
What critics of the FAR debarment system often fail to under-
stand is that debarment is a business decision13—it is not designed
to punish past misconduct or put companies out of business.  Fines
and incarceration are prosecutors’ tools designed solely for the
purpose of punishing past misconduct.  In contrast, the FAR 9.4
regime protects the government’s diverse interests by requiring
SDOs to consider a multitude of factors that help the SDO deter-
mine whether a contractor is a “presently responsible” business
partner.14  The system is not intended to be used as a sledge-
hammer, sentencing companies to the corporate death penalty
without regard for the protection of the government’s nuanced
best interests.  Given the severity of the consequences that may
result from debarment, “the system is designed not only to protect
the government, but the rights of contractors as well.”15
Contrary to recent statements made by certain members of Con-
gress, the regime does not demand a contractor’s exclusion if
9. Jessica Tillipman, Suspension & Debarment Part I: An Introduction, FCPA BLOG (June
5, 2012), http://www.fcpablog.com/blog/2012/6/5/suspension-debarment-part-i-an-
introduction.html.
10. See 48 C.F.R. § 9.405(a).  In addition, debarment may also preclude the award of
state and local government contracts, as well as procurement opportunities with interna-
tional organizations, such as the World Bank or United Nations.  The extraordinary
reputational damage associated with a company’s debarment often negatively impacts a
contractor’s commercial relationships as well. See Tillipman, supra note 5. R
11. Tillipman, supra note 5. R
12. Id.
13. See Jolie Lee, Suspension, Debarment a “Business Decision” for Agencies, FED. NEWS
RADIO (June 14, 2012), http://www.federalnewsradio.com/486/2903438/Suspension-
debarment-a-business-decision-for-agencies.
14. 48 C.F.R. § 9.406-1(a).
15. Tillipman, supra note 5. R
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there is a basis for debarment.  The FAR expressly states that “[t]he
existence of a cause for debarment . . . does not necessarily require
that the contractor be debarred.”16  In order to determine whether
the government’s interests need protection through debarment,
an SDO looks beyond the misconduct to the contractor’s present
responsibility.  When considering the potential exclusion of a con-
tractor, the SDO first determines whether there are grounds for
the suspension or debarment of the contractor.17  If a basis exists,
the SDO should then consider whether there are any mitigating
factors establishing the contractor as “presently responsible”
despite the past misconduct.18  Factors that suggest “the contractor
is unlikely to repeat past misconduct—such as changes in person-
nel or procedures, restitution, or cooperation in a government
investigation—can incline an agency’s decision against debar-
ment.”19  Indeed, if the contractor is “presently responsible despite
past misconduct, it presents no threat to the government’s inter-
ests, making debarment inappropriate.”20
Unfortunately, because of the congressional focus on punish-
ment rather than protection, any SDO decision against suspending
or debarring a contractor is often viewed as inappropriate or evi-
dence of a broken debarment system.  This fixation on debarment
renders critics willfully blind to the efficacy of other procurement
fraud remedies.  Indeed, debarment is but one tool among many
that enables agencies to combat fraud and poor contractor per-
formance.21  For example, when appropriate, SDOs may enter into
administrative compliance agreements with contractors that
require companies to undergo a significant ethical transforma-
tion—such as revising and enhancing their internal compliance
16. 48 C.F.R. § 9.406-1(a).
17. 48 C.F.R. §§ 9.406-2, 9.407-2 list the causes for debarment and suspension
(respectively).
18. 48 C.F.R. § 9.406-1(a) (providing a list of mitigating factors that a debarment offi-
cial must consider in making a debarment determination).
19. KATE M. MANUEL, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 34753, DEBARMENT AND SUSPENSION
OF GOVERNMENT CONTRACTORS: AN OVERVIEW OF THE LAW INCLUDING RECENTLY ENACTED
AND PROPOSED AMENDMENTS 9 (2012).
20. Todd J. Canni & Steven A. Shaw, Comments on the Wartime Contracting Commission’s
Recommendations on Suspension and Debarment, SERVICE CONTRACTOR, Sept. 2011, at 13, 14.
21. Prepared Remarks, Stephen Shaw, Deputy Gen. Counsel, Dep’t of Air Force, Pro-
tecting Taxpayer Dollars: Are Federal Agencies Making Full Use of Suspension and Debar-
ment Sanctions? 4 (Oct. 6, 2011) [hereinafter Protecting Taxpayer Dollars], available at
http://oversight.house.gov/wp-content/uploads/2012/01/10-6-11_Tech-IP_Suspension-
Debarment_Sanctions_Steven_Shaw_Testimony.pdf (explaining that Suspension & Debar-
ment Officials (SDOs) “already have all the tools [they] need to protect the Government
and effect meaningful change”).
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systems, retaining an independent compliance monitor, con-
ducting ethics and compliance training for employees, and contin-
ued cooperation with the government.  While debarment is
appropriate in some instances, “[i]n most cases, the government is
not threatened by continuing to deal with a contractor whose
employees engaged in isolated misconduct but whose management
corrected the problem and is now acting responsibly.”22  The dis-
cretion afforded to SDOs enables them to determine not only
whether debarment is appropriate, but to select and implement
the best possible solution to enhance contractor compliance and
improve corporate governance.
Given the wide range of tools at an SDOs’ disposal, Congress’s
fixation on the overall number of suspensions and debarments is
misplaced.  Indeed, increasing the number of exclusions does not
mean that the system has been improved or that contractors have
become more compliant.23  Instead of focusing on the govern-
ment’s nuanced best interests, congressional pressure is creating a
system in which agencies believe they must remove contractors in
order to increase their debarment statistics—rather than truly
weighing the best interests of the government.24  This unfortunate
“submission to perceived political pressure” will have a devastating
and long-term impact on the procurement system.25
II. THE MYTH OF “TOO BIG TO DEBAR”
Recent statements by critics have shamefully perpetuated misin-
formation about the debarment regime and helped fuel increasing
congressional ire towards the system.  Critics contend that large
contractors evade debarment because they are simply too big to be
excluded.  For example, after several high-profile violations of the
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA), there were numerous calls
22. Shaw, supra note 3. R
23. Protecting Taxpayer Dollars, supra note 21, at 2 (“The number of actions taken— R
which appears to be the focus of some people—is not the best metric to assess the effective-
ness of a suspension and debarment program.”).
24. Neil Gordon, Report Shows Suspensions and Debarments on the Rise, PROJECT ON GOV’T
OVERSIGHT (Sept. 21, 2012), http://pogoblog.typepad.com/pogo/2012/09/report-shows-
suspensions-and-debarments-on-the-rise.html (“Twenty-seven federal agencies and depart-
ments (accounting for 98 percent of all federal contract spending) reported a total of
5,838 suspensions, proposed debarments, and debarments in fiscal year 2011.  This is a 39
percent increase over FY 2010 and a 119 percent increase over FY 2009.”).
25. Shaw, supra note 3 (“Given that S&D decisions cannot be appealed within the R
executive branch and can be overruled by a court only where there is an abuse of discre-
tion, it is incumbent upon agency officials to exercise their authority more thoughtfully
and responsibly.”).
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for debarment to be used to punish companies’ overseas miscon-
duct.  Following large FCPA settlements with U.S. enforcement
authorities, such as those with Siemens26 and BAE,27 individuals
raised concerns about the ability of these contractors to continue
obtaining large contracts from the U.S. government.28
Framed as a concern for taxpayer dollars, critics have argued
that it was outrageous for these contractors to continue participat-
ing in the U.S. procurement system following their FCPA-related
settlements with the government.29  They have demanded that
these contractors be “punished” by being banished from the pro-
curement system.30  Given the populist appeal of this argument, it
has gained significant traction.  Even though the FCPA impacts
companies across many different sectors, critics have repeatedly
singled out government contractors and called for their removal
from the procurement system.  Critics of the regime do not argue
that debarment is needed to protect the government from immi-
nent harm.  Instead, they argue that contractors need to be pun-
ished to deter other contractors from engaging in the same
behavior.31  They contend that if companies are bribing officials
abroad, they are most likely bribing officials here.32  Some critics
also argue that debarment is the proper course of action, even if it
harms the government’s best interests, simply to ensure that the
United States is not sending mixed messages about overseas
corruption.33
The focus on utilizing debarment as a form of punishment is not
only illegal, it ignores the substantial penalties these companies
26. Press Release, Dep’t Just., Siemens AG and Three Subsidiaries Plead Guilty to For-
eign Corrupt Practices Act Violations and Agree to Pay $450 Million in Combined Criminal
Fines (Dec. 15, 2008) [hereinafter Siemens AG and Three Subsidiaries Plead Guilty], avail-
able at http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2008/December/08-crm-1105.html.
27. Press Release, Dep’t Just., BAE Systems PLC Pleads Guilty and Ordered to Pay
$400 Million Criminal Fine (Mar. 1, 2010) [hereinafter BAE Systems PLC Pleads Guilty],
available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2010/March/10-crm-209.html.
28. See Drury D. Stevenson & Nicholas J. Wagoner, FCPA Sanctions: Too Big to Debar?,
80 FORDHAM L. REV. 775, 776, 801 (2011).
29. See id. at 801.
30. Id. (“In categorically refusing to seriously consider suspending or debarring com-
panies that undermine confidence in free markets overseas, our nation risks eroding the
public’s trust in government institutions at home.”).
31. Id. at 778.
32. Id. at 781.
33. Id. at 813 (stating that SDOs should “regularly consult with the DOJ, Congress,
and other policy makers to determine whether avoiding the collateral consequences that
may result from debarring contractors . . . justifies the mixed messages and toxic side
effects that result from the United States’ complacency in preventing the spread of
corruption”).
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have paid for their misconduct and fails to consider the best inter-
ests of the government.  BAE and Siemens paid two of the largest
fines ever levied under the FCPA regime—$400 million for BAE34
and $800 million for Siemens35 (on top of $856 million in fines
levied in Germany).  Moreover, despite the critics’ misleading
claims to the contrary, in both the BAE and Siemens enforcement
actions, SDOs conducted a review of the companies’ present
responsibility and found that they did not need to be excluded in
order to protect the government’s interests.  The SDOs properly
looked at the required mitigating factors and found that despite
the companies’ misconduct, they posed no imminent threat to the
government.
In the case of Siemens, the Defense Logistics Agency (DLA)
issued a formal determination that Siemens was a responsible con-
tractor.36  DLA did so for the very same reasons that Siemens
received a reduced fine/penalty in its settlement with the U.S.
Department of Justice (DOJ).  Among numerous other initiatives,
Siemens cooperated extensively with the government and com-
pletely overhauled its compliance program.37  Moreover, in addi-
tion to terminating management that engaged in the misconduct,
the company now has hundreds of compliance personnel.38
Indeed, Siemens’s compliance program is now viewed as the gold
standard in anti-bribery compliance.39
In the BAE matter, despite vocal claims to the contrary, the Air
Force did consider debarring BAE.  The Air Force, concerned with
BAE’s lack of cooperation with the DOJ’s bribery investigation,
sent the company a “Show Cause”40 letter—placing the onus on
BAE to demonstrate its present responsibility.41  After receiving the
letter from the Air Force, BAE immediately began cooperating
34. BAE Systems PLC Pleads Guilty, supra note 27. R
35. Siemens AG and Three Subsidiaries Plead Guilty, supra note 26. R
36. Legal Proceedings – First Six Months of Fiscal 2009, SIEMENS (Apr. 29, 2009),
available at http://secfilings.nyse.com/filing.php?ipage=6287828&DSEQ=&SEQ=29&
SQDESC=SECTION_PAGE.
37. See Department’s Sentencing Memorandum at 22, United States v. Siemens
Aktiengesellschaft, No. 1:08-cr-00367 (D.D.C. Dec. 12, 2008).
38. See id. at 22.
39. See id. at 24.
40. A “show cause” letter is sent to the contractor detailing instances of suspected
misconduct, and provides the contractor with an opportunity to submit evidence to show
that it is a responsible contractor. See FAQ Topic, DEP’T AIR FORCE GEN. COUNSEL, http://
www.safgc.hq.af.mil/questions/topic.asp?id=1643 (last visited Mar. 4, 2013).
41. See Letter from Steven Shaw, Deputy Gen. Counsel, Dep’t of the Air Force, to Ian
King, Chief Exec. Officer, BAE Sys. (July 19, 2011), available at http://www.safgc.hq.af.mil/
shared/media/document/AFD-110801-026.pdf.
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with the DOJ, eventually agreeing to pay a $400 million fine and
allowing the Air Force to investigate BAE’s processes, procedures,
and culture.42  Following an extensive review, the Air Force deter-
mined that BAE was presently responsible and that debarment was
not necessary to protect the government’s interests.43
Given that the FAR 9.4 discretionary debarment regime is
designed to protect the government’s interests and not punish past
misconduct, the agencies properly decided not to debar the pres-
ently responsible companies.  Moreover, in both cases, the threat
of eliminating the contractors’ government revenue streams pro-
vided the SDOs with significant leverage to facilitate ethical trans-
formations in the companies.  Indeed, this leverage can be used as
a “carrot and stick” to encourage ethical conduct and punish fail-
ure with debarment.44  By focusing only on the past misconduct,
rather than those factors relating to the companies’ remediation
and cooperation, critics (including legislators45) have drawn unin-
formed and, in some instances, provably false conclusions.46
The “too big to debar” myth has been perpetuated outside the
FCPA context as well.  Most recently, commentators heavily criti-
cized the government for its failure to debar BP following the
Deepwater Horizon oil spill in 2010.47  Immediately after the spill,
critics demanded BP’s immediate exclusion from the U.S. procure-
ment system, arguing that BP should be “punished” for the unprec-
edented environmental and economic disaster.48  When BP was not
immediately excluded, the situation was considered proof that cer-
tain companies are simply “too big to fail.”49  Complaints regarding
42. See Protecting Taxpayer Dollars, supra note 21, at 3. R
43. Id. at 4.
44. Canni & Shaw, supra note 20, at 15. R
45. Indeed, one member of Congress even proposed a bill that would make debar-
ment mandatory for violations of the FCPA. See Overseas Contractor Reform Act, H.R.
5366, 111th Cong. (2010) (passed the House but never passed the Senate).
46. See Tillipman, supra note 5, for a discussion of how ignoring BAE’s remedial R
efforts can lead to an inaccurate conclusion.
47. See, e.g., Rena Steinzor & Anne Havemann, Too Big to Obey: Why BP Should Be Debar-
red, 36 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 81, 83 (2011); Neil Gordon, Debarment for BP?
Don’t Be Fuelish!, PROJECT ON GOV’T OVERSIGHT (July 7, 2010), http://pogoblog.typepad.
com/pogo/2010/07/debarment-for-bp-dont-be-fuelish.html.
48. Steinzor & Havemann, supra note 47, at 83; Gordon, supra note 47; see also Rumors R
of BP Debarment, DAILY KOS (May 23, 2010), http://www.dailykos.com/story/2010/05/23/
869234/-Rumors-of-debarment-for-BP (“In what would be the most fitting punishment for
BP’s many crimes, there are rumors that the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) is
considering debarment for the company.”) (emphasis added).
49. Ron Nixon, Size Protects Government Contractors That Stray, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 17,
2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/12/18/us/politics/18contractor.html (“While
small companies are often debarred, the biggest ones, like BP, have become the equivalent
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BP’s continued ability to receive government contracts reached a
fever pitch following the company’s historic $4.5 billion settlement
with the U.S. government in November 2012.50  The critics were
proven wrong soon thereafter when the Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA) suspended BP, noting that the Deepwater Horizon
incident and response demonstrated a “lack of business integ-
rity.”51  One would expect the critics to be pleased with the EPA’s
actions, yet soon after the EPA’s announcement, some managed to
find a new reason to criticize the government for not “punishing”
the company with an even longer exclusion from the procurement
system.52
While the conduct prompting BP’s settlement and suspension
was undeniably egregious, the conversation surrounding BP’s
exclusion was a prime example of the flawed, misguided, and
sometimes even shockingly false information that is often spread
about the FAR 9.4 procurement regime.  Proponents of the “too
big to debar” myth fundamentally fail to grasp the purpose of the
system—a perspective which appears to convince them that any-
thing short of debarment is evidence of a failed regime.  One critic
noted as follows:
A more general form of debarment is explicitly designed to
“protect the public interest” and cannot be used to “punish”
contractors.  Because government officials use this language to
avoid debarment whenever it seems inconvenient, the nuclear
of ‘too big to fail,’ Senator Russ Feingold, Democrat of Wisconsin, said at a Congressional
hearing this year.”); Justin M. Davidson, Polluting Without Consequence: How BP and Other
Large Government Contractors Evade Suspension and Debarment for Environmental Crime and Mis-
conduct, 29 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 257, 279 (2011) (“Quite simply, some companies are too
big to ban, providing these companies with the ability to essentially circumvent the threat
of company-wide debarment when faced with the choice of whether to conduct themselves
properly or whether to follow ‘business as usual’ methods.”).
50. Danielle Ivory, BP Seen Escaping U.S. Contracting Ban After Oil Spill Settlement,
BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (Nov. 15, 2012), http://www.businessweek.com/news/2012-11-
15/bp-seen-escaping-u-dot-s-dot-contracting-ban-after-oil-spill-settlement (“‘[I]t looks like
there will be little if any suspension or debarment for BP,’ said Charles Tiefer, a law profes-
sor at the University of Baltimore.”).
51. Press Release, Envtl. Prot. Agency, BP Temporarily Suspended from New Con-
tracts with the Federal Government (Nov. 28, 2012), available at http://yosemite.epa.gov/
opa/admpress.nsf/0/2AAF1C1DC80C969885257ABF006DAFB0.
52. See Letter from Robert Weissman, President, Pub. Citizen, and Tyson Slocum,
Energy Program Dir., Pub. Citizen, to Lisa P. Jackson, Adm’r, Envtl. Prot. Agency  (Dec. 4,
2012), available at http://www.citizen.org/documents/Letter-EPA-Debar-BP-2012-12-04.
pdf. Indeed, Public Citizen’s call for a 5-year debarment, the length of BP’s probation,
ignores the purpose of the debarment regime.  By linking debarment with a punitive pro-
bationary period, the organization has demonstrated that it is less concerned about pro-
tecting the government’s interests than it is with adding an additional layer of punishment
to BP’s panoply of sanctions. Id.
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option does not seem to worry the Fortune 500 corporations
that dominate Department of Defense (DOD) purchase
orders.53
Sadly, statements like this pay lip service to text of FAR 9.4, while
simultaneously condemning the debarment regime for not being
wielded as a “nuclear” form of punishment.  Moreover, the sugges-
tion that DOD’s largest contractors do not take the threat of debar-
ment seriously is not only baseless, but laughable, particularly given
the sharp increase in suspension and debarment activity in recent
years.54
If critics would actually look behind the statistics, they would
realize that large contractors do not “escape” the system because
SDOs are too afraid to exclude them.  Rather, they are more likely
to have the resources to eliminate the problem and demonstrate
present responsibility.  For instance, in large multinational corpo-
rations, the misconduct is typically limited to a certain division of
the company, enabling the SDO to exclude that division while per-
mitting the remainder of the company to continue contracting
with the government.55  Similarly, large contractors often possess a
greater ability to correct the misconduct, fire the responsible
employees, implement robust compliance programs, and demon-
strate present responsibility.56  Conversely, in small companies “the
person responsible for the misconduct might be the company
leader who is also critical to making or providing what the govern-
ment needs. ‘If you remove or isolate him, you isolate the exper-
tise, and the company can’t really provide a service to the
government.’”57
Furthermore, the baseless, yet oft repeated claim that the gov-
ernment refuses to debar its favorite contractors58 does not com-
53. Rena Steinzor, The Nuclear Option: Debar BP, End $2 Billion Fuel Sales Now, CPR
BLOG (Nov. 15, 2012), http://progressivereform.org/CPRBlog.cfm?idBlog=0619824F-07
FA-9E6B-44CA4D5D66B6651C.
54. See INTERAGENCY SUSPENSION & DEBARMENT COMM., FEDERAL AGENCY SUSPENSION
AND DEBARMENT ACTIVITIES 6 (2012), available at http://www.epa.gov/isdc/pdf/isdc_sec-
tion_873_fy_2011_report_to_congress_lieberman.pdf.
55. For example, in February 2012, the Air Force suspended the San Antonio office of
Booz Allen. See OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY GEN. COUNSEL, DEP’T OF THE AIR FORCE, MEMORAN-
DUM IN SUPPORT OF THE PROPOSED DEBARMENTS OF BOOZ ALLEN HAMILTON, INC. 1 (2012),
available at http://www.federalnewsradio.com/pdfs/BAH_Notice_and_Memo.pdf.
56. Tillipman, supra note 5. R
57. Nixon, supra note 49 (statement of Alan Chvotkin, executive vice president and R
counsel of the Professional Services Council).
58. Stevenson & Wagoner, supra note 28, at 775 (“Enforcement officials shy away from R
debarring entities that violate the FCPA due to the short-term inconvenience of an
agency’s inability to transact business with its favorite contractor . . . .”).
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port with reality: in recent years, SDOs have excluded some of the
country’s largest contractors, such as BP, Booz Allen,59 Enron,60
Arthur Anderson,61 MCI Worldcom,62 several Boeing Launch Sys-
tems divisions,63 an L-3 Communications’ Special Support Pro-
grams Division,64 IBM,65 GTSI,66 and AED.67  By perpetuating
misinformation about the debarment regime, critics create a narra-
tive that often influences members of Congress to create “solu-
tions” in search of a problem.  While the debarment regime is not
flawless, the critics’ hyperbolic claims reveal themselves as catchy
slogans with little substance.
III. LEGISLATIVE CONTRACTOR-BASHING
Criticism from the media, various commentators, and watchdog
groups often negatively influences a public that is largely unin-
formed about the debarment process, creating public pressure to
rid the government of “bad” contractors.  Certain members of Con-
gress have been eagerly receptive to this anti-contractor rhetoric
and have pursued legislative “remedies” designed to “fix” a pur-
portedly broken debarment regime.  While the debarment regime
is not perfect, these legislative “solutions” never truly address the
perceived deficiencies in the system.
Recent government audits of the debarment regime demon-
strate that while some agencies need to improve their use of
existing suspension and debarment tools, others have robust pro-
grams that adequately protect the government.68  Any weaknesses
59. See OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY GEN. COUNSEL, supra note 55, at 1. R
60. Dorn McGrath, Misconduct Unrelated to Federal Contracts Could Lead to Suspension or
Debarment, NAT’L DEF. (May 2005), http://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/archive/
2005/May/Pages/ethics_corner5770.aspx.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Protecting Taxpayer Dollars, supra note 21, at 2. R
64. Id.
65. Jill Aitoro, IBM Suspended from New Federal Contracts, GOV’T EXEC. (Mar. 31, 2008),
http://www.govexec.com/dailyfed/0308/033108j1.htm.
66. Nick Wakeman, GTSI Suspended but Vows to Fight, WASH. TECH. (Oct. 1, 2010),
http://washingtontechnology.com/articles/2010/10/01/gtsi-fights-sba-charge.aspx.
67. Dana Hedgpeth & Josh Boak, USAID Suspends District-Based Nonprofit AED from Con-
tracts Amid Investigation, WASH. POST (Dec. 8, 2010), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2010/12/08/AR2010120807665.html.
68. Compare U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, SUSPENSION & DEBARMENT: SOME
AGENCY PROGRAMS NEED GREATER ATTENTION, AND GOVERNMENTWIDE OVERSIGHT COULD BE
IMPROVED 2–5 (2011), and INSPECTOR GEN., DEP’T OF DEF., ADDITIONAL ACTIONS CAN FUR-
THER IMPROVE THE DOD SUSPENSION & DEBARMENT PROCESS (2011), with INTERAGENCY SUS-
PENSION & DEBARMENT COMM., supra note 54, at 6, and U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE,
SUSPENSION AND DEBARMENT: DOD HAS ACTIVE REFERRAL PROCESSES BUT ACTION NEEDED TO
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identified by auditors have typically involved certain agencies
underutilizing their suspension and debarment tools.69  The defi-
ciencies are not the result of an absence of appropriate tools or
legislation.  Yet, despite the findings of independent auditors,
members of Congress continue to propose unnecessary, and in
many instances counterproductive, legislation designed to funda-
mentally overhaul the debarment regime, often undermining con-
tractor due process rights in the process.
Given the populist appeal of anti-contractor rhetoric, debarment
legislation has become a staple of congressional initiatives.70  Some
members of Congress are unrivaled in their determination to use
the debarment system to “weed out”71 bad contractors with little or
no regard for other procurement fraud remedies.  They have made
clear that they believe the debarment system is broken, that
unscrupulous contractors are stealing taxpayer dollars, and that
increasing the use of debarment is the only means available to pro-
tect government interests.72
In recent years, there has been a significant effort by members of
Congress to strip SDOs of their discretion and transform debar-
ment into a tool of punishment through legislation designed to
automatically debar contractors.73  Congress does not appear to
care about present responsibility, mitigation, or remediation—it
seems to only care about sending a message and ridding the system
of those it deems “bad contractors.”74  Certain members appear to
give little weight to the fact that SDOs have often carefully consid-
ered whether the government’s interests need to be protected.  To
many members, it is a numbers game—if debarment is not used
PROMOTE TRANSPARENCY 2 (2012) [hereinafter GAO, DOD HAS ACTIVE REFERRAL
PROCESSES], available at http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-12-932.
69. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 68, at 11. R
70. A brief search of opencongress.gov shows that since 2006, the following bills have
proposed debarment of federal contractors for various offences: H.R. 5366; H.R. 3588,
112th Cong. (2011); H.R. 1555, 111th Cong. (2009); H.R. 2825, 111th Cong. (2009); H.R.
1668, 111th Cong. (2009); H.R. 2904, 110th Cong. (2007); H.R. 3033, 110th Cong. (2007);
H.R. 3496, 110th Cong. (2007); H.R. 6243, 109th Cong. (2006); H.R. 5505, 109th Cong.
(2006).
71. See generally Weeding Out Bad Contractors, supra note 1, at 1 (addressing what Con- R
gress has deemed the “unacceptable and costly” problem of bad contractors).
72. See id. at 3. See generally Jared Serbu, Suspension and Debarments Rise Amid Pressure
from Congress, FED. NEWS RADIO (June 14, 2012) http://www.federalnewsradio.com/406/
2903240/Suspension-and-debarments-rise-amid-pressure-from-Congress (noting Con-
gress’s pressure on agencies to suspend and debar irresponsible contractors).
73. See, e.g., H.R. 5366, 111th Cong. (2010).
74. See Weeding Out Bad Contractors, supra note 1, at 1 (stating how debarment “is used R
all too rarely”).
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extensively, then agencies have not done their job and Congress
must do it for them.75  Congress has made it abundantly clear that
they are unhappy when contractors continue to receive govern-
ment contracts, even in instances where an SDO has determined
that a contractor’s corrective actions are adequate and the com-
pany is deemed presently responsible.
Recently, there has been a flurry of legislative activity designed to
“fix” the debarment regime, including proposals for mandatory
debarment—an initiative that demonstrates no regard for a con-
tractor’s present responsibility.  Moreover, these initiatives often
ignore the due process protections afforded to contractors, such as
notice and an opportunity for a hearing.76  These critical due pro-
cess protections stand in recognition of the harsh consequences of
exclusion, which “stigmatize” the contractor and act “immediately
to deprive a contractor of the ability to seek business and generate
revenue for a significant period of time.”77
Sadly, despite a well-established body of case law and the plain
language of FAR 9.4, many critics of the debarment regime, includ-
ing certain members of Congress, view due process protections as a
burden—precluding the quick and efficient execution of “bad con-
tractors.”  Frustrated by contractors’ due process protections,
which have been described by Senator McCaskill as “bureaucratic
handcuffs,”78 she and other members have proposed (and in some
instances, passed) legislation that bypasses discretion and elimi-
nates due process in order to rid the system of “bad contractors” as
quickly and thoughtlessly as possible.  Alas, not only have Con-
gress’s recent initiatives failed to address perceived deficiencies in
the system, they have actively harmed it.  For example, in a move
that has left most of the procurement community bewildered, Con-
gress inserted provisions into the 2012 Consolidated Appropria-
75. See, e.g., id. at 3 (statement of Sen. Joseph Lieberman) (stating that suspension
and debarment are used too rarely).
76. See MANUEL, supra note 19, at 12.  In contrast with debarment, contractors may be R
“suspended without prior notice or an opportunity to be heard so long as they are ‘imme-
diately advised’ of the suspension and allowed to offer information in opposition to the
suspension within 30 days.” Id.
77. Todd J. Canni, Shoot First, Ask Questions Later: An Examination and Critique of Suspen-
sion and Debarment Practice Under the FAR, Including a Discussion of the Mandatory Disclosure
Rule, the IBM Suspension, and Other Noteworthy Developments, 38 PUB. CONT. L.J. 547, 550
(2009).
78. Jared Serbu, Bill Aims to Overhaul Wartime Contracting, FED. NEWS RADIO (Mar. 2,
2012), http://www.federalnewsradio.com/526/2769631/Bill-aims-to-overhaul-wartime-
contracting (quoting Sen. McCaskill as stating “the weight of those processes was weighing
down the ability to hold contractors accountable”).
\\jciprod01\productn\J\JLE\45-2\JLE202.txt unknown Seq: 14 22-JUL-13 16:18
248 The Geo. Wash. Int’l L. Rev. [Vol. 45
tions Act that requires SDOs to affirmatively consider suspension
or debarment before awarding a contract to a corporation that has
either been convicted of a felony in the past twenty-four months or
has unpaid tax delinquencies.79  In other words, corporations (and
in some instances, individuals) are automatically excluded from
receiving contracts if they have been convicted of a felony criminal
offense in the preceding two years, unless an SDO affirmatively
considers debarment and determines it is not warranted.80
While it is not surprising that Congress slipped language into an
Appropriations Act that is akin to a mandatory exclusion, procure-
ment attorneys were stunned by its utterly confusing, inconsistent,
and illogical provisions.81  First, Congress only included the provi-
sions in five of the nine appropriations bills,82 subjecting some
agencies to this legislative debacle, while leaving others to continue
without restriction.  It is unclear how or why Congress selected the
covered agencies or if this selection process was even intentional.
In addition to the bewildering and selective coverage of certain
agencies, Congress also decided to impose different debarment
“triggers” in each of the bills with no apparent rationale for the
blatant inconsistencies.  While some of the clauses require the
exclusion of corporations convicted of a federal felony offense,83
others require exclusion for the conviction of a corporation’s
79. E.g., Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-74, § 504, 125 Stat.
852, 883 (“None of the funds . . . may be used to enter into a contract . . . with . . . any
corporation that was convicted . . . of a felony criminal violation . . . within the preceding
[twenty-four] months . . . unless the agency has considered suspension or debarment of
the corporation.”) (reauthorized by H.J. Res. 117, § 101(a)(10) (2012)).
80. Consolidated Appropriations Act § 8125.
81. See, e.g., Bob Wagman, Suspension and Debarment: What Have They Done Now?, GOV’T
CONT. LEGAL F. (Jan. 18, 2012), http://www.governmentcontractslegalforum.com/2012/
01/articles/suspension-debarment/suspension-and-debarment-what-have-they-done-now
(“Guaranteed to create uncertainty, the Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2012 . . .
included several little-noticed provisions generally excluding the use of federal funds for
any corporation convicted of a felony within the past 24 months.”); Suspension and Debar-
ment: New Trends and Continuing Due Process Debate, VENABLE LLP (July 13, 2012), http://
www.venable.com/suspension—debarment-new-trends-and-the-continuing-due-process-
debate-07-13-2012 (“A particularly disturbing facet of Congress’s recent push for increased
debarments is the recent uptick in attempts to impose automatic debarment provisions —
the latest effort being an automatic ineligibility for federal contracts and grants for felony
convictions contained in appropriations measures.”).
82. The appropriations including the language are: Department of Defense (DOD);
Energy and Water Development; Financial Services and General Government; Depart-
ments of Labor, Health and Human Services, and Education; and Military Construction
and Veterans Affairs.  Wagman, supra note 81. R
83. See, e.g., Consolidated Appropriations Act § 8125 (providing for restrictions on
appropriations for DOD).
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officers and agents as well.84  The astounding inconsistencies do
not stop there—in some provisions, exclusion is applicable to fed-
eral felony convictions, while in others, it is applicable to federal
and state felony convictions.85  These inexplicable discrepancies
are not only confusing, but are completely void of logic.  In its
haste to expel contractors from the procurement system, Congress
has created a system that is a blatant affront to reason.
Not surprisingly, these provisions caused significant panic and
chaos within the procurement community who had to quickly
determine how to navigate around the confusing and inconsistent
language.  Moreover, because the requirements were tied to an
Appropriations Act, a failure to follow the requirements could
cause an agency to violate the Anti-Deficiency Act.86  While agen-
cies have adapted slightly to this provision, the Appropriations lan-
guage has caused serious issues.87  For example, it requires each
individual awarding agency to make an affirmative debarment
determination before awarding a contract—a requirement which
has forced contractors to go agency-to-agency obtaining debarment
determinations.  This approach fundamentally undermines the
“lead agency” process, which was designed to maximize efficiency
when more than one agency may have an interest in the debar-
ment of a contractor.88  In its attempt to banish “bad” contractors,
Congress has created an inefficient, duplicative, and wasteful mess.
In light of all of the problems that this legislative quagmire has
created, Congress should ask itself—is this really in the taxpayers’
best interest?  Is the government significantly more protected with
these provisions in place?  Or is this just another example of legisla-
tive contractor-bashing?
Other recent initiatives highlight Congress’s propensity towards
discretion-depriving, legislative quick fixes.  Not only do they rob
contractors of their economic liberty, but they also undermine the
integrity and effectiveness of the entire debarment system. For
84. See, e.g., id. § 504, 125 Stat. at 883 (providing for restrictions on appropriations for
Energy and Water Development).
85. See, e.g., id. § 514.
86. Anti-Deficiency Act, 31 U.S.C. § 1341 (2006).
87. See, e.g., Memorandum from Richard Ginman, Dir., Def. Procurement & Acquisi-
tion Policy, to Commander, U.S. Special Operations, et al. 2 (Jan. 23, 2012), available at
http://www.acq.osd.mil/dpap/policy/policyvault/USA007336-11-DPAP.pdf (creating
Deviation 252.209-7999); see also Memorandum from Joseph A. Neurauter, Senior Procure-
ment Exec., GSA Office of Governmentwide Policy, to All GSA Contracting Activities 5
(2012), available at http://www.gsa.gov/graphics/fas/MAS-GSA-agency-deviation-2012-06.
pdf.
88. See 48 C.F.R. § 9.402(d).
\\jciprod01\productn\J\JLE\45-2\JLE202.txt unknown Seq: 16 22-JUL-13 16:18
250 The Geo. Wash. Int’l L. Rev. [Vol. 45
example, the Comprehensive Contingency Contracting Reform
Act of 2012, proposed by Senator McCaskill, was another punitive
initiative designed to erode SDO discretion.  In its initial form, it
required the automatic suspension of contractors in several situa-
tions, including, among other things, when the federal govern-
ment alleges fraud against a contractor in a civil or criminal
proceeding relating to a federal contract.89  By robbing SDOs of
their discretion and stripping contractors of their fundamental due
process rights, the legislation proposed to purge the government’s
business partners in a quick and thoughtless manner.90  Notably,
after receiving significant negative feedback from the procurement
community91 regarding the automatic suspension provisions, the
bill was reintroduced with automatic referrals to SDOs in lieu of
the suspensions.92  Sections of Senator McCaskill’s bill were eventu-
ally incorporated into the National Defense Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 2013, though the provision requiring automatic refer-
rals was removed.93
These recent legislative initiatives are merely two examples of
frequent congressional attempts to use debarment as a means to
punish contractors for their past misconduct.  These congressional
“armchair” SDOs repeatedly demonstrate that they either do not
understand how the debarment regime works or simply do not
care.  While members of Congress claim that they are not trying to
bash contractors and that they respect the government’s important
business partners, their legislative initiatives indicate otherwise.94
Members of Congress often view the companies as criminal organi-
zations that should be expelled from the procurement system.
89. Comprehensive Contingency Contracting Reform Act, S. 2139, 112th Cong. § 113
(2012); Comprehensive Contingency Contracting Reform Act, S. 3286, 112th Cong.
(2012).
90. The Comprehensive Contingency Contracting Reform Act of 2012: Hearing on
S.2139 Before the Subcomm. on Contracting Oversight, 112th Cong. (2012) (statement of
Patrick Kennedy, U.S. Dep’t of State), available at http://www.hsgac.senate.gov/subcom-
mittees/contracting-oversight/hearings/the-comprehensive-contingency-contracting-
reform-act-of-2012-s2139 (provisions imposing “automatic suspension and debarment . . .
will likely lead to due process challenges by the affected contractor community”).
91. See, e.g., ACQUISITION REFORM WORKING GRP., 2012 LEGISLATIVE RECOMMENDATIONS
32 (2012), available at http://www.ndia.org/Advocacy/Resources/Documents/ARWG
%20FY-2012_House_Senate%20Package_April%202012.pdf (“Congress must refrain from
passing laws that require the automatic suspension or debarment of contractors.”).
92. Compare S. 3286, 112th Cong. § 113 (2012), with S. 2139, 112th Cong. § 113
(2012).
93. See National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2013, H.R. 4310, 112th
Cong. § 861 (2013).  Notably, the Act’s debarment-related provisions are significantly
scaled-back when compared to Senator McCaskill’s original bill.
94. Serbu, supra note 78. R
\\jciprod01\productn\J\JLE\45-2\JLE202.txt unknown Seq: 17 22-JUL-13 16:18
2013] Congressional War on Contractors 251
They seek to punish contractors for improper activity that is often
caused by rogue employees (ignoring the fact that the companies
are often the victim of the rogue employees as well).95  The failure
to distinguish between rogue employees and their contractor-
employers is troubling—particularly when many contractors
employ hundreds (if not, thousands) of innocent and hard-work-
ing employees.
While the debarment regime is far from perfect, recent reports
from the Interagency Suspension and Debarment Committee and
General Accountability Office indicate that the debarment system
continues to improve and grow more active each year.96  Agencies
have responded to the intense congressional scrutiny and pressure
by strengthening their programs, sharing best practices and (in
addition to increasing the number of suspensions and debar-
ments), increasing their use of other tools, such as administrative
compliance agreements, show-cause letters and voluntary exclu-
sions.97  While there is always room for continued improvement in
the system, stripping SDOs of their discretion is neither a thought-
ful nor productive solution.  Moreover, mandatory exclusions sig-
nificantly hinder the government’s ability to craft proactive and
creative solutions to enhance corporate ethics and compliance.
While publicly bashing contractors may score some political
brownie points, debarring firms that pose no imminent threat to
the government is not only short-sighted, but self-defeating.  These
initiatives are void of the nuance required to craft balanced and
effective solutions to procurement fraud.  Holding hearings titled
“Weeding Out Bad Contractors: Does the Government Have the
Right Tools?”98 may be good politics, but it certainly is not good for
the government and its constituents.
95. See, e.g., ACQUISITION REFORM WORKING GRP., supra note 91, at 30. R
96. See INTERAGENCY SUSPENSION & DEBARMENT COMM., supra note 53, at 6–7; see, e.g., R
GAO, DOD HAS ACTIVE REFERRAL PROCESSES, supra note 68 (providing a positive review of R
the DOD’s suspension and debarment regime, while identifying a few areas that could be
strengthened further).
97. See, e.g., GAO, DOD HAS ACTIVE REFERRAL PROCESSES, supra note 68, at 12 (describ- R
ing the DOD’s use of suspension and debarment tools).
98. Weeding Out Bad Contractors, supra note 1. R
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